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Abstract— Currently there is an active Post-Quantum 
Cryptography (PQC) solutions search, which attempts to 
find cryptographic protocols resistant to attacks by means 
of for instance Shor’s polynomial time algorithm for 
numerical field problems like integer factorization (IFP) 
or the discrete logarithm (DLP). The use of non-
commutative or non-associative structures are, among 
others, valid choices for these kinds of protocols. In our 
case, we focus on a permutation subgroup of high order 
and belonging to the symmetric group S381. Using 
adequate one-way functions (OWF), we derived a Diffie-
Hellman key exchange and an ElGamal ciphering 
procedure that only relies on combinatorial operations. 
Both OWF pose hard search problems which are assumed 
as not belonging to BQP time-complexity class. Obvious 
advantages of present protocols are their conceptual 
simplicity, fast throughput implementations, high 
cryptanalytic security and no need for arithmetic 
operations and therefore extended precision libraries. 
Such features make them suitable for low performance 
and low power consumption platforms like smart cards, 
USB-keys and cellphones. 
Keywords— Post-Quantum Cryptography, Non-
Commutative Cryptography, Symmetric groups, 
Permutations, Diffie-Hellman key exchange.  
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC) is a relatively new 
cryptologic trend [1, 2] that acquired a NIST status [3, 4] 
and which aims to be resistant to quantum computers 
attacks (like Shor algorithm [5]). Two main lines of 
research are non-commutative cryptography (NCC) [6, 7, 
8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13] and non-associative cryptography 
(NAC) [13, 14, 15, 16, 17]. Belonging to the first 
category, this paper pursues the development of a fast and 
cryptanalytically secure solution using high order 
permutations [18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23].   The protocol is 
extremely simple and could be directly adapted to any 
kind of asymmetric solutions like key exchange, key 
transport, generalized ElGamal ciphering and ZKP 
authentication [24, 25,26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33]. The 
keystone here is to work with a high multiplicative order 
random permutation group <p>, belonging to the non-
commutative symmetric group S381 [18, 19, 20]. To 
achieve such performance, a carefully mix of randomness 
and structured symmetry was designed into the target 
permutation p.  
Security of an asymmetric cipher protocol always relies 
on a one-way function (OWF) [24]. For instance, using 
the decomposition problem (DP) or the double coset 
problem (DCP) [7], both assumed to belong to AWPP 
time-complexity (but out of BQP) [34] problems, which 
lead to an eventual brute-force attack, thus yielding high 
computational security. 
The cryptographic use of combinatorial structures like 
permutations is a long-known matter, either in linear way 
[20] or in two-dimensional combination like Row Latin 
Squares (RLS) [21, 22] or simply using quasigroups [23]. 
There are also patented protocols about [35]. 
Multidimensional tensor solutions are also conceivable, 
but their utility remains unclear. Other approaches into 
the same direction are the use of multiple orthogonal latin 
squares (MOLS) [36] and the use of non-group based 
latin squares [38]. More information about PQC, NCC 
and NAC could be found at published works and their 
own references. 
 
II. SOME STRUCTURAL DETAILS 
Permutations are simple combinatorial structures [20, 36]. 
A convenient way to map them as integers is the use of 
Lehmer’s factoradic representation [38, 39]. An optimal 
random permutation generation with an O(n) algorithm is 
described in [20] as Fisher-Yates-Durstenfeld Algorithm 
P.  
It is a known fact that the order of any permutation is the 
least common multiple of it independent cycle lengths 
[40]. So a simple way to construct a random high order 
group, is to embed any random permutation (say p) into 
prime length cycles using the increasing prime sequence 
[41] in random order. Summing those cycle lengths; one 
obtains the symmetric group orders into which the 
random permutation works as a generator of a cyclic 
subgroup, whose order is given by the respective 
primorial function [42]. A valid choice for the dimension 
of those lists that guarantee at same time high GDLP 
cryptographic security and does not deter computational 
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throughput, is the value 16.  Figure 1 displays the sixteen 
prime cycles, the defined S381 group and the resulting 
64-bits order of the cyclic subgroup <p>. At Fig. 1, the 
last value of the second and third lists are respectively the 
selected order of the symmetric group and the order of the 
cyclic subgroup generated by a random permutation 
whose cycle lengths are given by the first list. 
  
Fig.1: Parameter definitions 
 
III. DIFFIE-HELLMAN PROTOCOL 
Using above mentioned structures and operations, a 
generalized Diffie-Hellman key exchange is outlined at 
Fig. 2. 
 
Fig .2:  Generalized Diffie-Hellman key exchange 
The procedure is easy to follow with a numeric trial, as 
exposed separately in APPENDIX I, with same symbols 
as defined in Fig. 2. 
Using previous arguments and bearing in mind that 
neither polynomial time conventional DLP attack nor a 
quantum procedure against it is at hand; the 
computational security is assumed to be of 64-bits.  
The protocol works fast, using a non-optimized 
Mathematica interpreted code implementing a “square 
and multiply” routine and working on a ®Core i5 PC @ 
2.20GHz, the session mean time took 93,75 ms over a 
sample of 1000000 cycles. 
 
IV. ELGAMAL CIPHER 
Our version has his cryptographic security based on the 
double coset problem (DCP) or respectively, the 
decomposition problem (DP) as the one-way functions 
[7].  DCP or DP are supposedly hard challenges in group 
theory. As no quantum attack algorithm over symmetric 
groups is on sight and probably does not exist, these 
solutions do not belong to BQP complexity set. Of 
course, this statement should be proven; a challenge 
outside the purpose of present work.  
We present here both approaches. The general procedure 
is outlined at following figures. 
 
Fig.3:  Generalized ElGamal using DCP as OWF 
 
 
Fig.4:  Generalized ElGamal using DP as OWF 
 
Again, we proceed with a stepwise example. It is included 
at APPENDIX I using the DCP variation. All used 
symbols agreed with Fig. 3 definitions. 
 
V. CONCLUSIONS 
We developed a PQC solution using the symmetric group 
as the embedding structure. This approach fits into non-
commutative cryptography.  The random selection of high 
order elements is easy to obtain and lead naturally into 
big cyclic subgroups, where the DCP or the DP are hard 
to solve. Permutation group operations like integer 
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mapping, compositions (multiplications) and it powers, 
have easy solutions.  It relies only on simple 
combinatorial operations, no need of arithmetic or big-
number libraries.   This feature would enable its use in 
low computational resources environments like 
cellphones, smart cards, etc. 
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APPENDIX I: STEP BY STEP NUMERIC EXAMPLES OF THE GENERALIZED DIFFIE-HELLMAN KEY 
EXCHANGE AND GENERALIZED ELGAMAL CIPHER 
1. Generalized Diffie-Hellman Key Exchange 
 
Fig.1: Random permutation p, generator of the cyclic 
subgroup <p> belonging to S381. This public value could 
be concerted in advance or transferred to the second 
entity by the initiator. 
 
 
Fig.2: Embedded cycle lengths of p and cyclic subgroup 
<p> order, both public and fixed parameters. 
Once the generator is concerted, the protocol follows as 
usual with the selection of random secret exponents for 
each entity and subsequent exchange of public tokens.  
 
 
Fig.3: Alice and Bob randomly selected secret exponents 
{a.b} 
 
Fig. 4: Alice public token ta=pa. 
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Fig.5: Bob public token tb=pb 
 
Finally, both obtain a common session key because <p> 
has cyclic structure and powers commute. 
 
 
Fig.6: Alice key=(tb)a 
 
 
Fig.7: Bob key=(ta)b 
 
2. Generalized ElGamal Cipher 
Here we use the Fig 3. variation based on DCP. 
 
Fig.8: Public <p> generator. 
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Fig.9: Public auxiliar permutation 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig.10: Alice private values  
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Fig.11: Bob private values  
 
 
 
Fig.12: Public keys (Alice, Bob)  
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Fig.13: Alice session key and message  
 
 
 
Fig.14: ElGamal cipher pair (y1, y2) 
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Fig.15: Bob recovered message 
 
 
